قیمت‏‌گذاری و تعیین درجه سبز محصول در زنجیره‌های تأمین رقیب با درنظر گرفتن دخالت دولت

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی کارشناسی‌ارشد مهندسی صنایع، دانشکده مهندسی، دانشگاه کردستان، سنندج، ایران

2 استادیار گروه مهندسی صنایع، دانشکده مهندسی، دانشگاه کردستان، سنندج، ایران

چکیده

در این پژوهش به بررسی سیاست‌‏های قیمت‌‏گذاری و تعیین درجه سبز کالا در دو زنجیره‌تأمین رقیب پرداخته می‌‏شود. هر زنجیره شامل یک تولیدکننده و یک خرده‌‏فروش است که یک کالای سبز را تولید کرده و به مصرف‏کننده نهایی می‌‏رسانند. کالاهای تولید شده توسط این دو زنجیره جایگزین یکدیگر هستند. این مسأله در دو حالت درنظر گرفته شده است؛ در حالت نخست فرض می‏‌شود تولیدکننده رهبر بازار است، اما در حالت دوم خرده‌‏فروش نقش رهبر بازار را عهده‌دار خواهد بود. در هر دو حالت، دولت به‌عنوان یک عامل قوی، بر بازار تأثیرگذار خواهد بود. نحوه تأثیرگذاری دولت بر زنجیره‌ها بدین صورت است که دولت با برقراری یک سیستم یارانه/جریمه و نیز تعیین یک حداقل درجه سبز مشخص برای کالاها، جریمه و یا یارنه‌ای را برای هر تولیدکننده درنظر خواهد گرفت. در این پژوهش با توجه به قیمت‌های عمده‏‌فروشی و خرده‏‌فروشی و میزان یارانه و جریمه و هم‌چنین توابع تقاضا، تابع سود تولیدکننده و خرده‌‏فروش ارائه می‌‏شود. سپس با استفاده از رویکرد نظریه بازی‌‏ها، قیمت‌‏های تعادلی عمده‏‌فروشی و خرده‌‏فروشی و نیز درجه سبز تعادلی ارائه می‌‏شود. نتایج عددی نشان می‏‌دهد که بازی خرده‌‏فروش-استکلبرگ، شرایط بهتری را برای اعضای زنجیره و محیط زیست فراهم می‌‏کند و این تأثیر با میزان رقابت بین اعضا رابطه مستقیم دارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Pricing and Determining Product Greenness Level in Competing Supply Chains Under Government Intervention

نویسندگان [English]

  • , Mojtaba Nowrouzi Fasih 1
  • Anwar Mahmoodi 2
1 M.A. Student of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Kurdistan University, Sanandaj, Iran
2 Assistant Professor, Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Kurdistan University, Sanandaj, Iran
چکیده [English]

This study examines the pricing and product greenness level determining policies in two competing supply chains. Each supply chain consists of one manufacturer and one retailer, in which the manufacturer produces a green product, and the retailer delivers it to the end consumer. The manufactured products in supply chains are substitutable. This problem is considered in two scenarios: either the manufacturer or the retailer leads the market. In both cases, the government, as a powerful party, can affect the market by establishing a subsidy/punishment system. This system sets a threshold for the product greenness level and punishes or supports the manufacturer accordingly. In this research, we present the manufacturer and retailer profit functions, taking advantage of wholesale and retail prices, the amount of subsidy and punishment, and demand functions. Next, we use a game-theoretic approach to provide the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices and the equilibrium greenness levels. Numerical results show that the retailer-Stackelberg structure provides better conditions for the supply chain members and the environment, and it is even more highlighted with the competition intensity between the members

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Green supply chain
  • Game theory
  • Pricing
  • Government intervention

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نشریه پژوهش های مهندسی صنایع در سیستم های تولید
دوره 9، شماره 18
شهریور 1400
صفحه 97-109

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