به اشتراک‌گذاری اطلاعات، نشت اطلاعات و تحریف اطلاعات در یک زنجیره تأمین غیرمتمرکز با یک تولیدکننده و دو خرده‌فروش رقیب

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

دانشگاه الزهرا، تهران، ایران

10.22084/ier.2019.14110.1642

چکیده

خسارت ناشی از تصمیم‌گیری براساس اطلاعات نادرست و یا در شرایط عدم‌وجود اطلاعات، جبران‌ناپذیر است. ازاین‌رو، این مقاله تأثیر قرارداد به اشتراک‌گذاری درآمد را روی به اشتراک‌گذاری اطلاعات و همچنین نشت اطلاعات برای زنجیره تامینی با یک تولیدکننده و دو خرده‌فروش رقیب بررسی می‌کند. یکی ازخرده‌فروش‌ها در مورد پیش‌بینی خود از تقاضای غیرقطعی اطلاعات دقیق‌تری داشته و می‌تواند آن را با تولیدکننده به اشتراک بگذارد. تولیدکننده ممکن است، اطلاعات دقیق‌تر به‌دست‌آمده از یکی از خرده‌فروش‌ها را در راستای افزایش منافع خود، در اختیار خرده‌فروش دیگر قرار دهد (نشت اطلاعات). بنابراین خرده‌فروش آگاه‌تر نیز ممکن است اطلاعات خصوصی پیش‌بینی خود را به درستی با تولیدکننده به اشتراک نگذارد. از این رو تولیدکننده قرارداد به اشتراک‌گذاری درآمد را به آن خرده‌فروش پیشنهاد می‌دهد تا او را تشویق کند که اطلاعات خصوصی خود را به درستی در اختیار تولیدکننده و خرده‌فروش دیگر قرار دهد. نتایج نشان می‌دهد، اگرچه نشت اطلاعات توسط تولیدکننده منافع او را افزایش می‌دهد اما خرده‌فروش‌ آگاه‌تر را نیز به اشتراک اطلاعات نادرست که به ضرر تولیدکننده است، ترغیب می‌کند. همچنین، تجزیه و تحلیل‌ها نشان می‌دهد که تحت قرارداد به اشتراک‌گذاری درآمد، خرده‌فروشی که اطلاعات دقیق‌تری از پیش‌بینی تقاضای غیرقطعی دارد، اطلاعات خود را به درستی در اختیار تولیدکننده و خرده‌فروش دیگر قرار داده که موجب هماهنگی اعضای زنجیره تأمین و افزایش سودکل زنجیره تأمین می‌گردد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Information Sharing, Information Leakage and Information Distortion in a Decentralized supply Chain with one Manufacturer and Two Competing Retailers

نویسندگان [English]

  • Maryam Esmaeili
  • Hajar Kafshian Ahar
Department of Engineering, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

Decision-making based on inaccurate information or in the absence of information can result in irreparable damages. Hence, this paper examines the impact of the revenue sharing contract on information sharing and information leakage in a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. One of the retailers has more detailed information about the forecast of uncertain demand and can share it with the manufacturer. The manufacturer may also share the information send by the retailer having more accurate information to the other one in order to gain higher profits (information leakage). Therefore, the informed retailer may share his private information with the manufacturer inaccurately. As such, the manufacturer uses a revenue sharing contract to encourage the more informed retailer to release his private information truthfully to the manufacturer and the other retailer. The results show that although the information leakage by the manufacturer increases his profit, the informed retailer encourages to share incorrect information which is harmful to the manufacturer. Besides, the sensitive analysis reveals that under revenue sharing contract, the retailer with more accurate information about the uncertain demand will share its information truthfully to the manufacturer and other retailer, which makes coordination among the member of the supply chain which increases the profit of the whole supply chain.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Information sharing
  • Information leakage
  • Information distortion
  • Revenue sharing
  • Game theory
[1] Yao, D.-Q., Yue, X., Liu, J., (2008). "Vertical cost information sharing in a supply chain with value-adding retailers", Omega. 36(5): 838-851.

[2] Zhang, W.-G., Fu, J., Li, H., Xu, W., (2012). "Coordination of supply chain with a revenue-sharing contract under demand disruptions when retailers compete", International Journal of Production Economics. 138(1): 68-75.

[3] Giri, B., Sharma, S., (2014). "Manufacturer's pricing strategy in a two-level supply chain with competing retailers and advertising cost dependent demand", Economic Modelling. 38(102-111.

[4] He, X., Krishnamoorthy, A., Prasad, A., Sethi, S.P., (2011). "Retail competition and cooperative advertising", Operations Research Letters. 39(1): 11-16.

[5] Liu, B., Ma, X., Zhang, R., (2014). "Joint decision on pricing and advertising for competing retailers under emergency purchasing", Economic Modelling. 39(257-264.

[6] Yue, X., Liu, J., (2006). "Demand forecast sharing in a dual-channel supply chain", European Journal of Operational Research. 174(1): 646-667.

[7] Qian, Y., Chen, J., Miao, L., Zhang, J., (2012). "Information sharing in a competitive supply chain with capacity constraint", Flexible Services and Manufacturing Journal. 24(4): 549-574.

[8] Wu, J., Iyer, A., Preckel, P.V., Zhai, X., (2012). "Information sharing across multiple buyers in a supply chain", Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research. 29(01).

[9] Liu, H., Sun, S., Lei, M., Leong, G.K., Deng, H., (2016). "Research on Cost Information Sharing and Channel Choice in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain", Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2016(

[10] Bian, W., Shang, J., Zhang, J., (2016). "Two-way information sharing under supply chain competition", International Journal of Production Economics. 178: 82-94.

[11] Ha, A.Y., Tian, Q., Tong, S., (2017). "Information Sharing in Competing Supply Chains with Production Cost Reduction", Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. 19(2): 246-262.

 

[12] Setak, M., Ahar, H.K., Alaei, S., (2017). "Incentive mechanism based on cooperative advertising for cost information sharing in a supply chain with competing retailers", Journal of Industrial Engineering International, 1-16.

[13] Setak, M., Kafshian Ahar, H., Alaei, S., (2017). "Coordination of Information Sharing and Cooperative Advertising in a Decentralized Supply Chain with Competing Retailers Considering Free Riding Behavior", Journal of Industrial and Systems Engineering. 10(2): 0-0.

[14] Mishra, B.K., Raghunathan, S., Yue, X., (2007). "Information sharing in supply chains: Incentives for information distortion", IIE Transactions. 39(9): 863-877.

[15] Li, L., Zhang, H., (2008). "Confidentiality and information sharing in supply chain coordination", Management Science. 54(8): 1467-1481.

[16] Kong, G., Rajagopalan, S., Zhang, H., (2013). "Revenue sharing and information leakage in a supply chain", Management Science. 59(3): 556-572.

[17] Chen, Y., Özer, Ö. (2016). "Supply chain contracts that prevent information leakage".

[18] Cachon, G.P., (2003). "Supply chain coordination with contracts", Handbooks in operations research and management science. 11(227-339.

[19] Cachon, G.P., Lariviere, M.A. (2005). "Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations", Management science. 51(1): 30-44.

[20] Yao, Z., Leung, S.C., Lai, K.K., (2008). "Manufacturer’s revenue-sharing contract and retail competition", European Journal of Operational Research. 186(2): 637-651.

[21] Zhang, J., Chen, J., (2013). "Coordination of information sharing in a supply chain", International Journal of Production Economics. 143(1): 178-187.

[22] Saha, S., Goyal, S., (2015). "Supply chain coordination contracts with inventory level and retail price dependent demand", International Journal of Production Economics. 161(140-152.

[24] Liu, H., Özer, Ö., (2010). "Channel incentives in sharing new product demand information and robust contracts", European Journal of Operational Research. 207(3): 1341-1349.

[25] Zhu, X., Mukhopadhyay, S.K., Yue, X., (2011). "Role of forecast effort on supply chain profitability under various information sharing scenarios", International Journal of Production Economics. 129(2): 284-291.

[26] Ai, X., Chen, J., Ma, J., (2012). "Contracting with demand uncertainty under supply chain competition", Annals of Operations Research. 201(1): 17-38.

[27] Lei, M., Liu, H., Deng, H., Huang, T., Leong, G.K., (2014). "Demand information sharing and channel choice in a dual-channel supply chain with multiple retailers", International Journal of Production Research. 52(22): 6792-6818.

[28] Vives, X. (1984). "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand", Journal of economic theory. 34(1): 71-94.

[29] Gal-Or, E., (1985). "Information sharing in oligopoly", Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 329-343.

[30] Raju, J.S., Roy, A., (2000). "Market information and firm performance", Management science. 46(8): 1075-1084.

[31] Li, L. (2002). "Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition", Management Science. 48(9): 1196-1212.

[32] Winkler, R.L. (1981). "Combining probability distributions from dependent information sources", Management Science. 27(4): 479-488.

[33] Osborne, M.J., An introduction to game theory. Vol. 3. 2004: Oxford university press New York.

]23[ ابراهیمی‌نسب، ح.، حیدری, ج.، طالعی‌زاده، ع. (2017). "هماهنگ سازی سیاست­های سفارش­دهی و تولید در مدل روزنامه­فروش دوسطحی تحت قرارداد انعطاف مقداری", نشریه پژوهش­های مهندسی صنایع در سیستم­های تولید، 4(8): 119-134.