کاهش نشر کربن در یک زنجیره تامین دو سطحی با درنظر گرفتن سطح کیفیت، سیاست بازگشت محصول و قیمت گذاری بازپرداخت: رویکرد تئوری بازیها

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد، دانشکده مهندسی صنایع، دانشگاه ازاد اسلامی واحد تهران جنوب،

2 دانشکده مهندسی صنایع، پردیس دانشکده های فنی، دانشگاه تهران

چکیده

در محیط رقابتی امروز، با توجه به اهمیت مسائل زیست محیطی، مشتریان بازار ترجیح می‌دهند محصول با نشر کربن کم خریداری کنند. علاوه بر ان سطح کیفیت محصول و سیاست بازگشت محصول به عنوان یک خدمت پس از فروش محصول در تقاضای بازار نقش دارد. در این مقاله یک زنجیره تامین دو سطحی با یک تولیدکننده و یک خرده فروش را با در نظر گرفتن تاثیر متغیر های تصمیم نرخ کاهش نشر کربن، سطح موجودی باقی مانده خرده فروش بعد از درک تقاضا، میزان قیمت استرداد محصول بازگشتی از مشتری و سطح کیفیت محصول بر تقاضای بازار و تابع سود زنجیره تامین، خرده فروش و تولید کننده در دو حالت سیستم یکپارچه و غیر یکپارچه با بکار گیری روش های بازی نش و استکلبرگ در نظر گرفته شده است. در این مقاله نشان داده شد که متغیرهای تصمیم و سود زنجیره در حالت یکپارچه بیشتر از حالت غیر یکپارچه است و سود زنجیره در سیستم غیر یکپارچه در بازی نش بیشتر از سود ان در بازی استکلبرگ زمانی که خرده فروش رهبر است، می باشد. بهبود کیفیت محصول در حالتی که خرده فروش رهبر است، منجر به بهبود سود زنجیره و اعضای آن نمی شود و در حالت نش بهبود سود تولیدکننده را به همراه ندارد، در حالی که منجر به بهبود سود زنجیره و خرده فروش می شود.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Carbon Reduction in A two-echelon supply chain by considering quality level, return policy and refund pricing: game theory approach

نویسنده [English]

  • Ata Allah Taleizadeh 2
چکیده [English]

In today's competitive market, according to the importance of environmental issues, customers prefer to buy products with low carbon emission. Furthermore the quality level of products and return policy as an after-sales services has an effect on market’demand. In this article, a two echelon supply chain with one manufacture and one retailer by considering the effect of decision variables, including carbon emission reducing rate, residual inventory level of retailer, refund price and quality level on market’demand and profit of supply chain and its members in two centralized systems and decentralized form by using Nash equilibrium and ُStackelberg game is studied. We find out in a centralized form, the profit of the supply chain and decision variables are more than decentralized form. And in decentralized form in Nash equilibrium supply chain profit is more than retailer dominant case in ُُStackelberg game. Note importance of quality level in the retailer dominant cause is not cause of supply chain profit improvement and its members. And in Nash equilibrium, it does not show manufacture profit improvement as a result. But it leads to retailer and supply chain profits improvement.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Supply chain
  • Game theory
  • carbon emission reducing
  • quality level
  • return policy

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