ارائه الگوریتم جستجوی ممنوعه جهت حل مسئله مکانیابی-حمله- حفاظت تسهیلات بحرانی در شرایط عدم‌تقارن اطلاعات

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشگاه گلپایگان

2 عضو هیئت علمی

10.22084/ier.2020.19334.1860

چکیده

اکثر فعالیت‏های تروریستی که طی دو دهه گذشته به وقوع پیوسته است مبتنی بر اطلاعات دقیق انجام گرفته‏اند که منجر به ایجاد اختلال در فعالیت‏های اساسی کشور شده و خسارات گسترده‏ای را به‌همراه داشته است و ازاین‌رو این موضوع تهدیدی برای زیرساخت‏های عمومی می‏باشد. گسترش چشمگیر چنین فعالیت‏هایی، لزوم برای مکانیابی صحیح و حفاظت از این زیرساخت‏ها به‌منظور افزایش پایایی تسهیلات برای ارائه خدمات را نشان می‏دهد. در چنین شرایطی، بازی استکلبرگی بین طراح سیستم و مهاجم شکل می‏گیرد که طی آن بازیکنان بر اساس اطلاعاتی که از رقیب خود در اختیار دارند، در تلاشند تا با پیش‌بینی و پاسخگویی به استراتژی‏ انتخابی رقیب، ریسک تصمیم‏گیری‏ خود را کاهش دهند. به‌دلیل ارزش بالای اطلاعات و در اختیار نداشتن اطلاعات دقیق و صحیح در شرایط تضاد منافع، در این تحقیق برآنیم تا با مدل‌سازی مسئله مکانیابی-حمله-حفاظت در شرایط عدم‌تقارن اطلاعات و با فرض امکان حملات جزئی، به‌صورت یک مدل برنامه‏ریزی دوسطحی به بررسی مزایا و ریسک‏های ناشی از نادیده گرفتن عدم‌تقارن اطلاعات توسط طراح سیستم بپردازیم. با توجه به منطقی نبودن زمان حل روش کروش-کان-تاکر در مسائل بزرگ، در این تحقیق الگوریتم جستجوی ممنوعه‏ای مبتنی بر هش ارائه می‌نماییم و با محاسبه معیارهایی همچون منطقی بودن موزون و مستقیم، کارایی و اثربخشی الگوریتم پیشنهادی را با اجرای الگوریتم بر روی تعدادی مسئله نمونه تولیدشده به‌صورت تصادفی نشان می‌دهیم.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

A Tabu-search algorithm for location-interdiction-protection problem under asymmetric information

نویسندگان [English]

  • M. Mesibidgoli 1
  • Javid Jouzdani 2
1 Department of Industrial Engineering, Golpaigan University, Iran
2 Industrial Engineering Dept., Golpayegan University of Technology, Golpaygan, Isfahan, Iran
چکیده [English]

Most of the terrorist activities that have taken place over the past two decades have been based on accurate information, which has led to disturbances in the security and some extensive damages and it is a major threat to public and government infrastructures. The dramatic expansion of such activities has shown the necessity and importance of the correct location and protection of these infrastructures in order to reduce the damage caused by the attack to increase the reliability of facilities for providing services. In such cases, a Stachelberg game is formed between the system designer and the attacker. Due to the high value and the lack of accurate information in the context of confliction, in this research, we are going to model the location-interdiction-protection problem under asymmetric information as a bi-level programming model and explore the advantages and risks of neglecting the information asymmetry in decision-making. In order to solve the suggested bi-level model, two solution methods are proposed. At first, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are used to convert the model to a single level model.Then for large size problems, we develop a matheuristic which searches the solution space of the upper level problem according to tabu search principles, where a hash function calculates and records the hash values of all visited solutions for the purpose of avoiding cycling, and resorts to a CPLEX based exact solution technique to tackle the lower level problem. Test results show efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed heuristic algorithm.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Network Interdiction
  • Covering Facility Location
  • Protection
  • Tabu search algorithm
  • Information asymmetry
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