قیمت گذاری در یک زنجیره تأمین دو سطحی با در نظر گرفتن رقابت تولیدکنندگان در تصاحب بازار در سیستم تولید بر اساس سفارش با استفاده از نظریه بازی

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشگاه صنعتی اصفهان

2 عضو هیات علمی/دانشگاه صنعتی اصفهان

چکیده

این مقاله با استفاده از نظریه بازی­ها، به تجزیه و تحلیل یک زنجیره تأمین دو سطحی شامل دو تولیدکننده و دو خرده­فروش در یک محیط تولید بر اساس سفارش می­پردازد. در زنجیره تأمین مورد بررسی، تولیدکننده­ها با در نظر گرفتن تخفیف برای خرده­فروشی که به صورت انحصاری کالای آن­ها را عرضه می­کند سعی در تصاحب بازار دارند. در این مدل ارزش برند هر یک از تولیدکنندگان و وفاداری مشتریان به یک برند نیز در نظر گرفته شده است. در مدل استکلبرگ تعریف شده برای مسئله، پس از تعیین زمان تدارک از سوی تولیدکننده، درباره قیمت خرده­فروشی کالا تصمیم­گیری می­شود. یافته­های ما نشان­دهنده آن است که کاهش نسبت کالای دریافتی یک خرده­فروش از سوی یک تولیدکننده باعث افزایش قیمت خرده­فروشی آن خواهد شد. همچنین عرضه انحصاری یک کالا افزایش قیمت عمده­فروشی آن را در پی خواهد داشت.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Pricing in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Manufacturers’ Competing to Seizing the Market in the Make-to-Order Environment by Using Game Theory

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammad Amin Farrokhi 1
  • Morteza Rasti-Barzoki 2
1 Isfahan University of Technology
2 Isfahan University of Technology
چکیده [English]

This paper develops a model based on game theory to analyze a two-echelon supply chain consists of two manufacturers and two retailers, that are operating in a make-to-order environment. The considerable point in the defined supply chain is that the manufacturers by taking into account the discount to the retailer that exclusively sells their products want to seize the market. In this model, manufacturers’ brand value and customers loyalty to a brand has high importance. It should be noted that in the defined Stackelberg model retail prices would be determined after specifying the lead times. We show that the reduction in the proportion of goods received by a retailer from a manufacturer will increase its retail price, also the exclusive supplying of a good rising its wholesale price.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Pricing
  • Make-to-Order environment
  • two-echelon supply chain
  • Discount
  • Game theory

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